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SALES-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-USE AS A DEFENSE IN ACTION FOR

IMPLIED WARRANTY-Defendant installed an oil burner in plaintiff's apartment building. The burner failed to function properly and
exploded two months after installation. There was no evidence that the
furnace was repaired subsequent to the explosion. Plaintiff continued to
use the furnace for four years until a second explosion caused considerable
damage to the building. Upon inspection, the cause of the explosions
was found to be a defective system of heating and piping the oil. Plaintiff
brought this action for breach of implied warranty to install the furnace
in a good and workmanlike manner and recovered consequential damages.
On appeal, held, reversed. It was error to refuse to submit the issue of
contributory negligence to the jury. In an action based on implied warranty, the contributory negligence of the buyer is a defense to a claim for
consequential damages. Nelson 1.1. Anderson, (Minn. 1955) 72 N.W. (2d)
861.
Historically, warranty was based on tort, 1 but the prevailing view today
is that a suit for breach of implied warranty is a contract action.2 It is
also a form of strict liability and a complaint for breach of warranty need
not allege negligence on the part of the seller.3 Logically, it should follow
that contributory negligence is unavailable as a defense.4 However, there
is authority for the use of tort concepts in the warranty field and, particularly, for the use of contributory negligence as a defense to the buyer's
claim for consequential damages. This authority is generally found in
express warranty cases,5 and, to a more limited extent, in those implied
warranty cases where personal injury has resulted from the breach of
warranty. 6 In the former instance the courts analogize the wrong. to a
negligent misrepresentation,7 and in the latter situation to the tort of trespass to the person. 8 Some courts, moreover, apparently combine the
principles of both tort and contract to reach a decision. 9 Though courts
may differ as to whether implied warranty is contract or tort, there is
BREACH OF

1 See Prosser, "The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality," 27 MINN. L. REv.
117 (1943); Ames, "History of Assumpsit," 2 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1888).
2 E.g.: Simon v. Graham Bakery, 17 N.J. 525, 111 A. (2d) 884 (1955); Wells v. Oldsmobile Co., 147 Ore. 687, 35 P. (2d) 232 (1934); Huddleston v. Lee, (Tenn. App. 1955)
284 S.W. (2d) 705.
3 Basin Oil Co. v. Baash-Ross Tool Co., 125 Cal. App. (2d) 578, 271 P. (2d) 122 (1954).
4 Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P. (2d) 199 (1933); Vaningan v. Mueller, 208
Wis. 527, 243 N.W. 419 (1932).
5 Huddleston v. Lee, note 2 supra; Razey v. J. B. Colt Co., 106 App. Div. 103, 94
N.Y.S. 59 (1905); Ellen v. Heacock, 247 App. Div. 476, 286 N.Y.S. 740 (1936).
6 Madeiros v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 57 Cal. App. (2d) 707, 135 P. (2d) 676 (1943);
Merrimac Chemical Co. v. American Tool and Machine Co., 192 Mass. 206, 78 N.E. 419
(1906).
7 Dalrymple v. Sinkoe, 230 N.C. 453, 53 S.E. (2d) 437 (1949).
8 Knapp v. Willys-Ardmore, Inc., 174 Pa. Super. 90, 100 A. (2d) 105 (1953).
o Missouri Bag Co. v. Chemical Delinting Co., 214 Miss. 13, 58 S. (2d) 71 (1952);
Barber Mining and Fertilizing Co. v. Brown Hoisting Machinery Co., (6th Cir. 1919)
258 F. I.
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apparently no reai;on to prefer one interpretation over the other. Usually
the buyer can recover ordinary damages and those· consequential damages
that are the natural results of the breach, 10 but when, as in the principal
case, the buyer continues to use goods known to be defective, the damages
caused after the defect is known are not considered natural consequences
and both theories preclude recovery. 11 Under tort law the buyer is denied
recovery on the basis of contributory negligence.12 If a contract theory is
used, he cannot recover either because (1) he has failed to mitigate his
damages by returning or repairing the defective goods, 13 or (2) he has
waived his right to consequential damages by continuing to use them14
or, (3) it was not contemplated by the parties that the buyer would use
goods known to be defective.15 It does, however, make a difference what
view is taken when the buyer claims only those damages that are usually
recoverable.16 But even here it is not prudent for the courts to use one
process of reasoning in all situations. Both methods have their advantages;
the tort view makes the wrongful death acts17 and a more liberal measure
of damages18 available, whereas the contract theory usually gives the advantage of a longer statute of limitations.19 An adoption of one viewpoint
would cause the advantages of the other to be lost. Thus, courts may shift
from one interpretation of warranty to the other, depending on the facts
of the case before them, in order to gain the advantages of the doctrine
they need to do justice between the parties.20 This seems unnecessarily
confusing. But, on the other hand, to have the courts adhere to one or
the other theory of warranty just for the sake of uniformity may well result
in injustice.21 The best and possibly only solution to the question of
whether warranty is a contract or a tort action is to regard it as a combina10 McLachlan v. Wilmington Dry Goods Co., 41 Del. 378, 22 A. (2d) 851 (1941).
1;L Unless the buyer is held to have accepted the goods or failed to give notice of the
breach in a reasonable time, he does not lose his right to recover for ordinary damages
and those consequential damages that naturally result from the breach. Mallery v. Northfield Seed Co., 196 Minn. 129, 264 N.W. 573 (1936).
12Finks v. Viking Refrigerators, Inc., 235 Mo. App. 679, 147 S.W. (2d) 124 (1941).
13 Henley v. Sears-Roebuck and Co., 84 Ga. App. 723, 67 S.E. (2d) 171 (1951).
14 Coleman v. Carter, (Idaho 1955) 289 P. (2d) 932.
15 Pauls Valley Mill Co. v. Gabbert, 182 Okla. 500, 78 P. (2d) 685 (1938).
16 See note 11 supra.
17 Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E. (2d) 557 (1938).
18 In Madeiros v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., note 6 supra, plaintiff recovered on a tort
theory for damages which were proximate to the breach, but, because such damages
were not contemplated by the parties, they would have been denied by use of contract law.
19 Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E. (2d) 421 (1953). See
21 IND. L. J. 23 (1945), for a complete survey of the state statutes of limitations.
20 See Prosser, "The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality," 27 MINN. L. REv.
117 (1943); Amram and Goodman, "Some Problems in the Law of Implied Warranty,"
3 SYRACUSE L. REV. 259 (1952).
·
21 In Whitely v. Webb's City, Inc., (Fla. 1951) 55 S. (2d) 730, warranty was considered as based on contract with the result that the buyer's heirs were denied recovery
under a wrongful death act. In Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. (2d) 18, 266
P. (2d) 163 (1954), the shorter tort statute of limitations was applied and the buyer's cause
of action barred.

1956]

RECENT DECISIONS

1023

tion of both. 22 Warranty is in the shadowland between contract and tort, 23
and concepts of both are applicable to it. Thus, it should be regarded
simply as warranty and not bound by the rigid forms of either contract or
tort, but having some of the attributes of both. Further confusion among
the courts would thus be avoided and such defenses and measures of damages could be used as might be needed to do justice between the litigants.
Under this view, the Minnesota court's application of contributory negligence as a defense to breach of implied warranty would be valid. The
only criticism of the decision is not that the court classified implied
warranty as tort, ,contrary to the majority view, but that it attempted to
classify warranty at all.
Thomas S. Erickson

22 1 WILLISTON, SALES, rev. ed., §197, at p. 507 (1948), terms warranty as quasi-contract
and quasi-tort.
23 Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co., note 17 supra.

